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For the first time in 172 years, no one had control. After the 
1988 November general election, the Indiana House of 
Representatives found itself in quite a predicament; the citizens of 
Indiana had elected 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats to the Indiana 
House, giving neither party a majority, and thus, the power to 
organize and lead the House. Neither the Indiana Constitution, nor 
the House rules provided a mechanism for organizing the House when 
the membership was equally divided politically, so a whole new set 
of rules had to be developed. Faced with a unique, but troublesome 
situation, House party leaders began the usual festive and 
ceremonial "Organization Day" with bickering and stalemate. 
From November 22-24, 1988 the war raged. Legislators spent 
nearly 24 hours a day in negotiations, caucuses, and floor debate. No 
one could seem to agree. Proposal after proposal was heard and 
rejected as the legislative days ticked away, and the Thanksgiving 
holiday drew near. The House members considered electing one 
speaker and dividing the committee chairmanships evenly between 
the two parties, but this idea failed for the lack of agreement on 
which party would hold the powerful speaker position. Another 
option the legislators contemplated would have given one party the 
speakership and the other party the important committee 
chairmanships like Ways & Means, Rules, and Commerce. 
Incidentally this proposal also failed. The Speaker of the House
-
would still have been too powerful; by simply not assigning bills to 
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the committees chaired by the opposite party, the speaker would 
-
-

maintain ultimate authority. Realizing that the power of the 
speakership presented the biggest hurdle to organizing, 
Representative Mannweiler suggested that both he and 
Representative Phillips step out of the race for Speaker of the House 
and an outside party, not a member of the House, would be elected. 
Following the path of the other options, this idea was also rejected. 
Although House rules provide that the speaker does not have to be 
elected from the House membership, the legislators did not want an 
outside party to be their leader. It seemed as if a compromise would 
never be reached. However, after further looking at similar 
situations in other states and the compromises they reached to 
solve their problems, a workable agreement finally evolved. 
The state of Washington, a decade earlier, solved their 
dilemma of a tied legislature with a "co-speaker, co-committee 
chairman, co-everything" system that gave each party the same 
amount of power and control (Comparative ... 15). 
"The co-speakers in Washington presided on alternate days 
and co-chaired the Rules committee through which every bill 
must go before being placed on the House calendar. Each 
committee had an equal number of party members, and the six 
major committees were co-chaired. The remaining fourteen 
committees were parceled out with ...seven to each party. A bill 
could only come out of a committee with a majority vote, so 
each side had to find a defector. (Comparative ... 1979) 
Although everyone seemed skeptical about the chances of the 
- Washington plan succeeding, "the plan worked reasonably well and 
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objective observers seemed to feel the overall output more than 
satisfactory" (Comparative ... 1979). Credit for the success of the 
Washington co-system was attributed to the "personal friendship 
and extensive negotiation between the co-speakers" (Comparative ... 
1979). Analysts of the Washington experiment say the co-system 
was held together by the cooperative personalities of the speakers 
and their caucuses (Comparative ... 1979). Given Indiana's history 
strong partisan politics and that no other option seemed acceptable, 
a sharing of power seemed the only feasible option. 
Modeling after Washington's precedent, the Indiana House 
developed an agreement both parties felt comfortable accepting.1 
Under the dual-control agreement, Representatives Paul Mannweiler 
(R) and Michael Phillips (D) became co-speakers of the House of 
Representatives presiding on alternating days. Both speakers had to 
agree on the assignment of bills to the committee, or if no 
agreement could be reached, they would each assign bills authored 
by their own party members. Along with the co-speakers, the dual­
control system brought with it two of every position. There were 
co-committee chairmen, co-clerks, co-readers, co-janitors, etc. 
From staff members and salaries to office space and desk size, each 
party had to share power as equally a possible. The state spent an 
additional $1.9 million more than originally budgeted for the 
operation of the House of Representatives ensuring that each party 
had equal office space, staffs, and salaries (Blum 6). Perhaps the 
-
 1See Appendix I 
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biggest change, however, that came with the 50-50 split, was the
-
-

stripping of the speaker's powers. 
For the first time in 172 years, the Speaker of the House did 
not have the power to control the flow of legislation. In years past, 
not only could the Speaker assign bills to a committee, but he could 
set the calendar, and he held the sole ability of calling bills to the 
floor. The speaker decided what bills would appear on the calendar, 
and when, if ever, they would be debated and voted upon on the floor. 
One person, the speaker, held an immense amount of power; he could 
dictate and control the entire House of Representatives. Under the 
co-system individual members of the House were given the power to 
call their own bills from the calendar to the floor, and the speaker 
no longer had the authority to set the calendar. So, any bill that 
passed out of a committee would appear on the calendar and could be 
called to the floor by its author. Unlike the Washington plan where a 
bill required a majority vote to move out of committee, Indiana 
adopted a rule that any bill receiving a tie vote in committee would 
pass to the floor for further consideration. For this reason much 
legislation reached the floor of the House. Another new rule the co­
system instigated was the two-hour amendment rule. Members 
could no longer offer an amendment from the floor unless it had been 
filed with the clerks two hours before session began. 
Every organization needs someone in control, someone to lead, 
someone to give direction, someone to negotiate, someone to 
mediate, and some one to represent the group as a whole. Because 
good leadership and knowing who is in control is vital to the 
-
 operation and success of any organization, the co-system provided 
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an interesting challenge. With two leaders for every position, it
- was not always clear who was in control. The effectiveness in the 
operation of the 1989-1990 Indiana House of Representatives can 
thus be determined by looking at the co-system from the "hands-on" 
perspectives of the key legislative leaders: the co-speakers, the co­
floor leaders, the co-chairmen of the Ways & Means committee 
(Probably the most important House committee). and the Senate 
party leaders. 
By personally interviewing the eight following legislative 
leaders a better understanding of the co-system was developed. 
Co-Speakers Co-Ways & Means Chairmen 
Paul Mannweiler (R) Patrick Kiely (R) 
-
Michael Phillips (D) Patrick Bauer (D) 
Co-Floor Leaders Senate Party Leaders2 
Richard Dellinger (R) Robert Garton (R) 
Stan Jones (D) Dennis Neary (D) 
The following portion of this paper has been divided into 
sections, comparing partisan views of the system and then 
comparing how each co-counterpart viewed the effectiveness of the 
1989-1990 sessions. Comparisons were made both on a partisanship 
basis and within each co-pair to see how viewpoints were similar 
and different. The first goal of each interview was establishing 
-
 2See Appendix II for biographical details 
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that each legislator had enough of a legislative background to
-
-

compare a quote "normal" session to the 50-50 split sessions (The 
legislators averaged 15 1/2 years experience each.). It was 
important that each leader could give a fair view of the co-system 
by comparing its changes to the system of past years. 
The Partisan Perspective: 
When asked why Indiana opted for the dual-control system, all 
eight legislators agreed that time constraints played a big role in 
the decision. Representative Dellinger suggested that, "It was the 
necessity of moment. We are the citizen legislature, and we didn't 
want to waste any more time".3 With precious legislative days 
ticking away, and prediems ending if the legislature did not organize 
quickly, compromise was a must. Indiana only has 61 legislative 
days in a long session to pass a budget, and each day wasted trying 
to organize was one less day to work on legislation. "We made up 
our mind what we wanted for the state, and the idea of sharing 
power was important," Representative Jones noted. Representative 
Mannweiler added that, "From past experiences we knew the strong 
partisanship we were dealing with, and we knew cooperation and 
having an equal say was a must... The overall consensus, thus, 
seemed to be that time pressures and cooperating in a compromise 
were the main reason Indiana decided to model its dually-controlled 
House after the Washington system. 
-
3AII quotations in this paper, unless otherwise noted, are from the personal interviews 
conducted with the eight legislative leaders as documented in the works cited page. 
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The question posed, "How effective do you think the dual­
-
-

control system worked?", drew clear partisan lines. The Democrats 
interviewed thought the co-system worked quite well, while the 
Republicans overwhelmingly thought the system failed. Democratic 
views ranged from Representative Phillip's statement, "The system 
was very effective based on our accomplishments; we passed a 
budget and much good legislation", and Representative Bauer's 
feeling of "cooperation and working well together". To the 
Republican expression of sentiments like Senator Garton's, "The 
session was allowed to operate", and Representative Kiely's, "We 
survived; that's a positive". Although most of the legislators used 
the same criteria--what was accomplished, the budget and other 
necessary legislation--as the basis for determining effectiveness, 
they viewed it from opposite perspectives. Republicans 
acknowledged those accomplishments, but did not feel those were 
enough to deem the system effective; Democrats thought that was 
enough to call it effective. Representative Dellinger felt the system 
was also ineffective because "the committee process of weeding out 
bills did not happen, and that is what the process is about." He felt 
like someone had to be in control, and with the co-system, that was 
just not the case. From the opposite perspective, Representative 
Jones felt that "the committees were no longer acting as a bottle­
neck and more bills were passed." That fact was a good point from 
his point of view. Using the same criteria, one man views the 
function of the committees as a "weeding out" process, and the other 
as a "churning out" process. Two different views on the same thing, 
-
 bring about two different views on effectiveness. 
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Did Indiana set a good precedent for itself should the 
-
-

legislature ever face the same situation? Again, Republicans had 
more negative feelings to express than the optimistic Democrats. 
Representative Mannweiler said, "It was a freak show, but what else 
could we do?", and Representative Dellinger remarked, "Well, we set 
one, but not a good one. We took the easy way out." Representatives 
Phillips, Bauer, and Jones insisted that Indiana had set a good 
precedent for itself, "The system was more bipartisan and 
fair. ..there is no other way to solve the problem effectively." 
Although seven of the eight legislators interviewed expressed 
varying degrees of enthusiasm for the system, only Senator Neary 
felt "Indiana should try a different system if ever in the same 
situation. " 
The overall effectiveness rating on a scale from one to ten, 
with ten being highest, average a six. All of the legislator 
interviewed agreed that the system worked fairly well during the 
1989 session, and failed during the 1990 short session. The 
pressures of a redistricting election and knowing that the 
mismatched marriage was about to end contributed to the 
legislators lack of cooperation. "Tensions were high, people quit 
trying to make the system work, and things just got UGL V!", 
Representative Bauer exclaimed. Each party was trying to make a 
good record for itself, and to make an example of the other party 
before the fall elections. Representative Kiely verbalized a common 
sentiment by saying, "We [Indiana] deserve a five on a scale from one 
to ten, based on the fact that the state survived those two years of 
-
 dual-control." Representative Kiely rated the system a six because 
9 
of the short session disagreements. On the other hand, 
-
-

Representative Bauer gave the dual-control system "a nine on a scale 
from one to ten, because we got the job done under really difficult 
circumstances." Representative Bauer "would have said a ten if not 
for the ugliness of the short session." Senator Garton also failed the 
co-system during the short session, "We wanted it to work the first 
year, so I'd sayan eight on a scale from one to ten, but only a three 
the second year." The short session, the second year, really 
challenged the system. The co-system can, and did, operate quite 
effectively, but the system so relied on the cooperation and 
compromise of the individual legislators, it also operated quite 
inefficiently at times. The legislature accomplished its minimum 
goal--passing a budget--enough, some say, to deem the whole 
system effective. 
How did the co-system affect the number of bills heard and 
enacted into law? As expressed earlier, "Committees became 
fountains spewing to the floor 50 percent more legislation that 
normal (Traub, "Refinements ..." F-4). Senator Garton commented, 
"Anything that came to the floor, which was a lot, passed; there 
were no checks and no balances." On the same note Representative 
Dellinger remarked, "The Senate was our check on our outpour of 
legislation." Representative Jones and Bauer felt, "More bills were 
heard, but so what? What is wrong with getting more ideas heard 
and voted on? They were better bills with more input, balance, and 
bipartisan support." How did the number actually pan out? In the 
1989 long session, 354 bills became law, and in the short session, 
-
 185 new laws were enacted (The House and Senate Journals 1989­
--
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1990). The House approved approximately 125 more bills during 
- 1989 than in either the 1985 or 1987 sessions (Newland, "Dual. .. " A­
2). "In the past three short sessions, the legislature approved and 
the governor signed into law 210, 220, and 251 new laws (Traub F­
4). The co-system, when both years are looked at as a whole, 
produced about the same number of bills as any other two year 
session. 
Politically it seems that the Democrats are more affectionate 
toward the dual-control system that the Republicans. Both parties 
felt the state survived, passed a budget, and enacted other good 
legislation during the 1989-1990 sessions, and both parties used 
the above mentioned criteria for determining effectiveness. The 
difference came between the parties on philosophical points of view. 
The same criteria were seen as good by Democrats, and not enough to 
be called truly effective by the Republicans. We survived the 
difficult situation. As with the legislators, determination of 
effectiveness must be left up to the individual's point of view. 
The Co-Speakers: 
How were your respective jobs different under the co-system? 
"No one had control, so no one took responsibility," both 
Representatives Mannweiler and Phillips agreed. "We had to make 
joint decisions, and compromise was key," Representative Phillips 
noted. With the individual members holding the power to control the 
fate of their own bills, and the calendar being set automatically, the 
speaker's role became that of a mediator. Under the co-system, both 
speakers marked manageability and accountability as problems. The 
calendar was unpredictable, and both caucuses had to have all their 
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members present at all times. Representative Mannweiler felt, "The 
system was less effective than with a sole speaker, but it worked 
fairly well. The situation could not be changed, so we had to make it 
work." Representative Phillips mimicked Representative 
Mannweiler's perspective concerning handling the situation as best 
as possible. 
How did the speakers feel about the reforms that stripped the 
speaker of his dictatorial control? Both men felt "the reforms were 
good and long overdue." "The power of the House has been restored to 
the membership itself," Representative Phillips declared. "The 
shared responsibility between leaders and members is a good 
change .. .Iegislators will be more accountable," Representative 
Mannweiler assured. No longer can a legislator blame the speaker 
for killing their bills; each member had to take responsibility for 
the fate of their own legislation. However, in 1991 with the House 
of Representatives in Democratic control, the speaker regained the 
power to set the calendar. Members can still call their own bills to 
the floor, but they have to be placed on the calendar first. 
Representative Kiely noted, "The Speaker has all of his power back 
that he lost during the co-system." 
The Co-Floor Leaders: 
Representative Jones and Representative Dellinger provided 
the most extreme differences of opinion on the effectiveness of the 
co-system. Representative Jones felt, "The system works better 
with both parties in control, it's not faster, but the public is better 
served." Representative Jones was the only legislator interviewed 
- that had only positive comments about the co-system. 
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Representative Dellinger, on the other hand, was the system's 
-
-

biggest foe, "The system didn't work well at all. Bills were not 
weeded out, and no one was in control. I may sound a bit old­
fashioned," Representative Dellinger continued, "But, I like the 
speaker holding ultimate control over the flow of legislation." 
Representative Dellinger liked few of the changes the 50-50 split 
brought, and Representative Jones thought almost all of the changes 
attributed to the system's effectiveness. 
Each floor leader was responsible for leading their caucus and 
promoting their respective party positions, similar to their job 
during any other year. Representative Jones took his lead from the 
Governor's office and the House Democratic caucus. Representative 
Dellinger followed the lead of his caucus, and the Superintendent of 
Public Education, Dean Evans. In the aspect of promoting the party 
position, the floor leader's role change little under the 50-50 split. 
Both Representatives Jones and Dellinger saw more of an 
emphasis being placed on the individual legislators. "Fifty votes 
were not enough to pass legislation, but they were enough to block 
the other party's bills, " Representative Jones commented. Much 
more time was spent with individual members; if just one legislator 
refused to vote with the caucus, the other side could pass the bill. 
"We called those lone members terrorist because they could 
destroy everything ...we would spend hours in caucus talking 
to them and talking to them, drag them down to the Governor's 
office and talk some more, until finally the caucus was united," 
explained Representative Jones. 
-
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Legislative members were placed at the doors to-and-from the
-
-

chamber to keep track of members leaving. It was essential 
everyone's whereabouts were known at all times, in case 50 
members were needed on the floor. During the co-system, the 
impact one legislator could have on the system was felt drastically. 
The Co-Ways & Means Chairmen: 
Representatives Bauer and Kiely concurred that their jobs 
were easier in the "working together" relationship the co-system 
offered. Under the dual-control of the Ways & Means committee 
chairmanship, Representative Bauer was promoted half-a-step from 
ranking minority member, and Representative Kiely was demoted 
half-a-step from holding the sole chairmanship, Representative 
Bauer noted. "Sharing the power and responsibility, not only made 
the job easier, but better," added Bauer. Representative Kiely felt 
his job was easier as co-chairman because the traffic through this 
office was cut by approximately 70%. "Normally, between 300 and 
400 bills are assigned to the Ways & Means committee in a session, 
and the chairman is lobbyed by everyone," Kiely explained. During 
the 50-50 split, Kiely handled the Republican bills and Bauer dealt 
with the Democratic legislation. Representative Kiely maintained 
that his job was also easier under the co-chairmanship because the 
Governor was a Democrat. "It is the responsibility of the Ways & 
Means chairman to protect the Governor, if you are of the same 
party, and that can be a big job depending on the Governor, " 
Representative Kiely finished, "Representative Bauer felt that 
pressure." 
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During the 1989 session neither Representative Bauer nor 
Representative Kiely resorted to using their "wild cards" to hear 
bills the other chairman did not want to hear. The first session 
went smoothly, and the chairmen respected and cooperated with 
each other. The 1990 session went equally as well in the beginning. 
Representative Kiely scheduled a final committee meeting using his 
ten "wild cards" to hear Senate Republican bills. Representative 
Bauer had no more bills to hear, and as a result, he refused to honor 
Representative Kiely's "wild cards". Representative Kiely declared, 
"I scheduled the meeting like the rules allowed, but because the bills 
were controversial and Representative Bauer did not want to vote on 
them, the Democrats did not attend the meetings." Aside from the 
final battle, however, both co-chairmen felt the spirit of 
cooperation allowed the system to function effectively. 
The Senate Party Leaders: 
Senators Garton and Neary pinpointed the same problem with 
the House co-system structure. "We could never deal with anyone in 
charge because it changed everyday," Garton commented. Senator 
Neary echoed Senator Garton's impression by saying, "There was no 
cooperation, it was out of the Senate's hands. When discussing 
which days to be in session, we were at their mercy. The speakers 
make the decisions, and we had to go along or waste session days." 
Neither Senator Garton nor Senator Neary thought the co-system 
operated very effectively, especially in 1990. The dual-control 
system required constant compromise and cooperation, something 
that just did not occur as much as necessary, both men asserted. 
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Good points that the Senate party leaders saw with the co­
-
-

system were the reforms in the speaker's powers. "The Senate 
members enjoy controlling the fate of their own bills, and it was 
probably a good step for the House to make those changes," Senator 
Neary affirmed. "It's not good for the process for one man to wield 
so much power," Senator Garton concluded. The individual members 
assume more responsibility and are more accountable when they 
have control of their own bills," Senator Garton continued. Overall, 
Senator Garton and Senator Neary felt the co-system was 
ineffective, but not all bad, there were some good results." 
Conclusion: 
Did Indiana set a new landmark in governmental history? 
Representative Mannweiler would not go that far, but he did feel 
that we survived and were "effective in doing the job required under 
very difficult circumstances." Good, bad, or indifferent, the 
legislature leaders agreed Indiana definitely set a precedent for 
itself. Most of the legislators interviewed, though not completely 
thrilled with the dual-control form of government, felt it was a 
workable system. The eight legislators agreed the system was 
effective based on what was accomplished--the budget, important 
legislation, and the mere fact that the state survived. ~ 
effective the system was depended largely on which legislator you 
asked. With the exception of Representative Jones, the legislators 
formed a consensus that the state operates better when someone, 
whatever the party, is in control. Valuable lessons of cooperation 
and compromise between the two political parties were learned 
during the co-power system. Whether the system is deemed 
16 
effective or ineffective, those important lessons should not be
- quickly forgotten. 
-

-
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Memorandum of Understanding 
The following agreements and covenants are hereby entered by and between 
the Democratic caucus and the Republican caucus of the Indiana House of
-
-

Representat i ves: 
SPEAKER 
1. There shall be a Democratic Speaker of the House of 

Representatives and a Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives 

who shall hold equal rank( and authority. 

2. Each Speaker shall share equally the traditional powers of the 

Speaker except to the extent modified herein. 

3. The powers of each Speaker shall be controlled by the Standing 
"Rules 	 and Orders as adopted by a constitutional majority of the 
membership. 
4. The Democratic Speaker shall preside on one session day and the 

Republican Speaker on the next session day. 

5. Each Speaker shall appoint the co-chairmen of statutory, standing 

and select committees. committee members. and conference committee members 

of his respective party. 

6. Assignment of bills to committee shall be by agr,ement of the 

Democratic Speaker and the Republican Speaker. In the event that there is 

no agreement. then the Democratic Speaker shall assign bills authored by 

members of the Democratic caucus and the Republican Speaker shall assign 

bills authored by members of the Republican caucus. 

CLERK 
There shall be a Democratic Principal Clerk and a Republican Principal 

Clerk. Each Clerk shall have equal rank and authority. 

COMMITTEES 
1. Each standing. statutory, or select committee shall have co-chairmen 
who shall be equal in rank and authority. 
2. Each co-chairman shall share equally the traditional powers of a 

committee chairman. 

3. The standing committees shall be constituted with six (6) Democratic 
members and six (6) Republican members, except that Ways and Means shall have 
thirteen (13) Democratic members and thirteen (13) Republican members and 
Rules and Legislative Procedures shall have four (4) Democratic members and 
four (4) Republican members. 
-

4. The co-chairmen shall agree on the bills to be heard in the 
committee proceedings. If there is a dispute as to whether or not certain 
bills should be heard each co-chairman has the right to select a number 
of bill which represents five percent (5%) of all bills assigned to the 
committee or five (5) bills, whichever is greater, to be heard by the committee. 
S. The co-chairmen shall agree on the number of bills to be heard 
at any committee meeting. Each co-chairman shall then select one-half of 
the specific bills to be heard. 
6. A tie in the vote of a committee on a bill shall result in the 
bill being reported to the membership without recommendation. 
READING OF BILLS -- ,~ 
Each member shall have the right to call any bill on which that 
member is an author or sponsor to the floor for action on second or third 
reading. 
-
Denn; s Heeke Dan Stephan 
-

__ 
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1989-1990 Key Legis ative Leaders--Interviewed 
Co-Speakers of the House 
(R) Paul S. Mannweller (Dlst. 49; Mar­
Ion). One Indiana Square #2120. Indlan­
apolls46204. Attorney. Locke Reynolds 
- Boyd & Weisell. State Representative 

1978-88. Former Deputy Corp Counsel­

City of Indianapolis. Mbr--Bar Assns. 

ABA Comm on Equal Employment 0p­

portunity and Labor Relations. B.A., J.D. 

degrees, Indiana Unlv. Northminster Presbyterian Church. 

Republican Speaker. 
SEAT NO. 2. Committees: Ethics. 
Co-Floor 
(R) Richard M. Dellinger (Dlst. 38; Ha­
milton, Madison). 140 N. 15th, No­
blesville 46060. Teacher. State Repre­
sentative 1972-88. Noblesville City 
Council 1968-73. Mbr--Presldentlal 
AdviSOry Comm. on Funding Elementary 
and Secondary Schools, Tau Kappa 
Alpha Natl Forensics Honorary. Natl 
Societyof State Legislators. B.S .• Ball State Unlv.; M.A., Butler 

Unlv. Methodist Church. Republican Floor Leader. 

SEAT NO, 1. Committees: Commerce; Govt Affs; R.R.M .• 

House Admns; Rules & Legis Procedure. 

(D) Michael K. Phillips (Dlst. 74; 

Dubois, Gibson, Perry, Spencer, War­

rfck). 301 W. Main St., Boonville 47601. 

Attorney, Phillips & Long, P.C. State 

Representative 1970, 1974-88. Majority 

floor leader 1975-76; Minority floor 

leader 1977-86. Deputy prosecuting 

attomey 1974. Mbr--WarrIck County 

Chamber ofCommerce • Bar Assns.• Elks, Masons. Graduate, 

Eagleton Inst. for State Legislators; DePauw Unlv.; IU Law 

School. Presbyterian. Democrat Speaker. 

SEAT NO. 52. Committees: Courts; R.D.M., Rules & Legis 

Procedure. 

Leaders 
(D) Stanley G. Jones (Disl. 26; Tippe­
canoe, Warren). 1120 Ravinia, West 
Lafayette 47906. Director of Develop­
ment,lvy Tech, Lafayette. State Repre­
sentative 1974-88. Legislator of the 
Year. Izaac Walton League 1976; Out­
standing Young Hoosier, Indiana Jay­
cees 1983; Legislative Leadershlp 
Award. Indiana Council of Churches 1983. Sigma Chi. B.S. 
engineering, Purdue Un Iv. Democrat Floor Leader. 
SEAT NO. 51. Committees: Const Law; Ethics; R.D.M., : 
Education; Rules & Legis Procedure. ,
I 
Co-Ways & Means Chairmen 
(R) Patrick J. Kiely (Dlst. 36; Delaware, (D) B. Patrick Bauer (Dist. 7; SI. Jo­
Madison). 4947 Founders Court. Ander­ seph). 1307 Sunnymede Ave., South 
son 46011. Vice President and Manager, Bend 46615. Teacher. State Represen­
City Securities Corporation, Anderson. tative 1970-88. Mbr--American Fed of 
State Representative 1978-88. Chrmn-­ Teachers, Ind State Teachers Assn. 
State Tax and Financing Policy Commis­ Graduate, Univ. of Notre Dame; M.S., 
sion; State Budget Committee. Mbr-Ind Indiana Unlv. Member of SI. Anthony's 
Econ Dev Council. Outstanding Fresh­ Catholic Church. 
man Legislator, Ind Broadcaster's Assn 1979-80; Outstanding SEAT NO. 54. Committees: Public Health; Co-Ch .• Ways & 
Young Hoosier. Ind Jaycees 1982; Natl Distinguished Service Means. 
Award. Ind Disabled American Veterans Assn 1985. Exec 
Bd-College of Business Alumni Assn-BSU. Beta Theta PI. 
Chesterfield Optimists. B.S.. Ball State Un Iv. SI. Mary's 
Catholic Church. 
SEAT NO. 20. Committee: Bhics; Co-Ch.• Ways & Means. 
President Pro Tempore and Minority Floor Leader--Senate 
(D) Dennis P. Neary (Dlst. 8; LaPorte (R) 	 Robert D. Garton (Dlst. 41; 
Starke). 3304 laSalle Tr., MIchigan City Bartholomew, Johnson). 530 Franklin 

St., Columbus 47201. Personnel con­
 46360. Teacher. State Senator 1976· 
88. Precinct committe sultant, Robert Garton Associates. 

State Senator 1970-86. Listed in 
 eman. Mbr--Long Beach Civic Club. 
Indiana Unlv. Alumni Assn. B.A., Murray 
Southwestem Bartholomew Water 
'Who's Who In the Midwest", Bd mbr--
StateUnlv.; M.S., IndlanaUnlv. Catholic 
Corp. Mbr-Beta Theta PI. First United Church. Minority Floor Leader. 
SEAT NO. 29. Committees: Appts & Claims; R.M.M., Rules Methodist Church. B.S., Iowa State Unlv .• M.S., Cornell Unlv. & Legislative Procedure, U.S. Marine Corps Veteran. President Pro Tern. 

SEAT NO.1. Committee: Ch., Rules and Legislative Proce­

dure. 

